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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case arises under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
et. seq. (2005) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et. seq (2005).
Both acts are federal statutes. Federal courts have jurisdiction
over all cases arising from federal statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2005). Petitioner filed a timely appeal from a final judgment en-
tered by a federal district court. Accordingly, this Court has juris-
diction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2005).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the PCB-impregnated soil at Major Electronics man-
ufacturing facility is a "point source" under CWA § 504(14), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14).
2. Whether the allegations of BRK that Major Electronics dis-
charge of PCBs into the Bearclaw River violates water quality
standards established by the state of New Union under CWA
§ 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313, are actionable under the CWA.
3. Whether the CWA preempts the federal common law of nui-
sance for non-point source pollution.
4. Whether the CWA preempts state common law of nuisance for
non-point source pollution originating in another state.
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5. Whether BRK may maintain a public nuisance claim on be-
half of its members under the "special injury" rule.
6. Whether BRK has claims for reimbursement and summary
judgment against Major Electronics under CERCLA § 113(f),
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), in the absence of pending or previous ac-
tion under CERCLA §§ 106 or 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 or 9607
and whether BRK's claim under § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, can
be denied as inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan
without an explanation of how it differs from the plan.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District
Court for the District of Progress granting Major Electronics,
Inc.'s ("Major Electronics" or "Major") motions for summary judg-
ment. Bearclaw River Keeper, Inc. ("BRK") brought suit against
Major Electronics pursuant to § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, the citizen
suit provision of the Clean Water Act ("CWA" or the "Act"), com-
plaining that Major Electronics violated § 301(a) of the Act which
forbids the addition of a pollutant to navigable water without a
permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). BRK further alleges that Major Elec-
tronics is violating federal and state common law of nuisance. The
Town of Noblesville ("Noblesville"), located in the State of New
Union, was granted leave to intervene as a Plaintiff-Appellant in a
number of BRK's CWA and nuisance claims. Noblesville also
brought a claim against Major Electronics, seeking reimburse-
ment of response costs and summary judgment under § 113(f) of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). BRK amended its
complaint to make a similar CERCLA claim.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ma-
jor Electronics on four grounds. First, the district court agreed
with Major that CWA § 301(a) was not violated. This decision was
based on the court's holding that the polychlorinated biphenyl
("PCB") impregnated soil at Major's manufacturing facility is not
a "point source" under CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). R. at
6. BRK challenges the district court's ruling that the soil beneath
Major's facility is not a point source and that CWA § 301 was not
violated.
Second, the district court agreed with Major that violations of
water quality standards are not actionable under the citizen suit
provision as a violation of "an effluent standard or limitation"
under CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). R. at 7. Noblesville
2006] 553
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joins BRK in arguing that water quality standard violations are
actionable under the CWA.
Third, the district court granted Major's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that BRK could not maintain common
law nuisance claims because the CWA preempts the federal com-
mon law of nuisance for non-point source pollution and the state
common law of nuisance for non-point source pollution originating
in another state. Even if the federal and state common law of nui-
sance were not preempted by the CWA, the court held that BRK
lacks standing to bring a nuisance action on behalf of its members
because they have not suffered a "special injury" separating their
harm from the injury imposed on the general public. R. at 8.
Noblesville joins BRK in arguing that the CWA does not preempt
the federal or state common law of nuisance for non-point source
pollution but does not join BRK in arguing that BRK can maintain
a public nuisance claim under the "special injury" rule.
Fourth, the district court agreed with Major Electronics that
BRK does not have any CERCLA claims. The court held that
there can be no cause of action for contribution in the absence of a
pending or previous action under CERCLA §§ 106 or 107. The
Court further reasoned that Noblesville, like Major, is a "liable
party" under § 107 and as such, has no claim under that same
section. Finally, the court held that BRK's claim for recovery is
inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"). R. at 9.
Both BRK and Noblesville argue the district court erred in holding
they have no CERCLA claims.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
BRK is a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of
the State of New Union and its members include residents of the
Town of Noblesville, State of New Union. R. at 3. Noblesville is
located on the banks of Bearclaw River (the "River") one mile
downstream from New Union's border with the State of Progress.
R. at 4. Eighty percent of the Noblesville's population is a racial
minority group, Proto-Litigian, and on average, the population is
just above the poverty level with Noblesville being the poorest
town in the state. Id.
The town's population relies on the Bearclaw River to provide
recreational activities such as swimming and fishing at the public
beach. Id. The state has classified a fifty-mile stretch of the Bear-
claw River from the state line downstream past Noblesville as
"Class B" waters which are suitable for fishing and contact recrea-
554 [Vol. 23
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tion use. R. at 4-5. However, the New Union Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation ("NUDEC") has warned the residents
that using the public beach and swimming in the River may ex-
pose them to unsafe levels of PCBs. R. at 5. The state's water
quality criterion states that PCBs shall not exceed X concentra-
tion in "Class B" waters. Id. After a wet-weather event, concen-
trations of PCBs in the river adjacent to the public beach exceed X
concentration. Id. In addition, NUDEC and the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") have advised Noblesville residents
against eating fish from the river since fish taken at locations on
or near the public beach contain levels of PCBs that exceed safety
levels established by the FDA. Id. NUDEC surveys initially indi-
cated that these warnings did not result in a diminution of local
consumption of fish from the river and residents continued to eat
on average twelve pounds of fish from the river every year. Id.
In the spring of 2005 however, Noblesville spent $50,000 to
construct an eight-foot high chain link fence to prevent access to
the public beach and to increase policing of the area to prevent
swimming and fishing. Id. BRK also spent $500 on signs posted
on the fence warning residents of the dangers of PCBs in the river
and on the public beach. After these actions, local swimming from
the beach decreased by thirty percent and fishing decreased by
twenty-five percent although residents continue to swim and fish
in other portions of the Bearclaw River. Id.
The only known sources of PCBs in the section of the Bear-
claw River around Noblesville are the Noblesville public beach
and an electrical equipment manufacturing facility located two
miles upstream in Fort Union, State of Progress. Id. This facility
is owned by Major Electronics, a corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Progress. R. at 3. Major has manufactured
electrical equipment at this facility for decades and until 1980,
used PCBs as heat-resistant conduction material in its equipment.
R. at 4.
Over the last several decades, spills and equipment leaks of
PCBs at Major's facility have impregnated the soil beneath the
facility with PCBs at depths that reach the watertable. R. at 4, 6.
Like Noblesville, this facility is located directly on the banks of the
Bearclaw River. R. at 4. Furthermore, the water table beneath
the facility is located upgradient from the Bearclaw River. Id. Be-
cause of the facility's proximity to the river and water table, when
it rains, precipitation soaks into the soil and through the vadose
2006] 555
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zone1 which carries concentrations of PCBs attached to the soil
particles into the Bearclaw River. The river then flows past
Noblesville and its public beach two miles downstream from Ma-
jor's facility. Id. The State of Progress has classified the Bearclaw
River from upstream of Major's facility to the state border with
the State of New Union as "Class C" waters suitable for industrial
and non-contact recreational use. Id. The State of Progress does
not have PCB water quality standards for "Class C" waters. Id.
Major Electronics has a National Pollution Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES) permit issued to it by the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under CWA
§ 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, which allows it to discharge treated efflu-
ent from its manufacturing process lines into the Bearclaw River.
Id. In Major's initial NPDES permit application and in subse-
quent renewal applications, it reported occasional low-level con-
centrations of PCBs in its wastewater discharge but the issuing
authority did not include a PCB effluent limitation in Major's per-
mit. Id. However, Major has reported that its wastewater dis-
charge is occasionally contaminated by incidental concentrations
of PCBs from unknown sources. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It has been widely held by courts of appeal that the definition
of point source should be interpreted broadly to include convey-
ances other than pipes and ditches. Because the PCB contamina-
tion of the Bearclaw River comes from an identifiable point of
discharge that can be attributed to Major Electronics, the district
court erred in holding that the PCB impregnated soil beneath the
Major facility does not constitute a point source.
Major Electronic's discharge of PCBs from its manufacturing
facility is the cause of violation of New Union's water quality stan-
dards. This violation is actionable under the CWA because BRK
is authorized to bring suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1365 for violations of
water quality standards and violations of the water quality stan-
dards are themselves a violation of the CWA.
If this Court determines that the soil beneath the Major Elec-
tronics' facility is not a point source, it must be considered a non-
point source for the purpose of the CWA. The court below did not
fully appreciate the significance of this distinction in its interpre-
1. Water or solutions in the earth's crust above the permanent groundwater
level. Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003).
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tation of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) and
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), two cases in which the Supreme
Court held that the federal common law of nuisance was pre-
empted with respect to point-sources falling under the CWA's com-
prehensive regulatory scheme. Because the Court's decision was
narrowly limited to point sources and non-point sources fall
outside of the CWA's regulatory scheme, BRK may maintain an
action in nuisance against Major Electronics under the federal
common law.
The district court also erred in holding that the CWA
preempts the operation of New Union's common law of nuisance
as it applies to a non-point source of water pollution originating in
the State of Progress. This error is based on its misinterpretation
of International Paper Corporation v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
(1987) where the Court narrowly held that Vermont's common law
of nuisance was preempted as it applied to a New York point
source. The CWA does not expressly or impliedly preempt the ap-
plication of one state's common law to an out-of-state non-point
source polluter, and New Union's common law as applied to these
sources is not in conflict with the Act. Therefore, BRK may main-
tain an action in nuisance against Major Electronics under New
Union common law.
The district court also erred in applying the "special injury"
rule to grant summary judgment on BRK's public nuisance claim.
The "special injury" rule was put in place several centuries ago
with valid justifications. Those justifications no longer exist and
so the rule should no longer bar meritorious claims. Even if the
"special injury" is applied to the facts here, BRK can show that
they have suffered an injury "different in kind." They have suf-
fered injuries to both their livelihood and physical injuries.
Neither of which is suffered by the public generally.
Finally, the district court erred in granting summary judg-
ment on BRK's CERCLA claim for failure to be consistent with the
NCP. Summary judgment is only proper when a party fails to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element. Consistency
with the NCP is not an essential element as several circuits have
held and the purpose of CERCLA requires. Since it is not an es-
sential element, it is improper to grant summary judgment on
that basis. Even if consistency with the NCP is found to be an
essential element, there are circumstances when summary judg-
ment is not proper for inconsistency with the NCP. A limited re-
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cord, as is present here, is one of those special circumstances. The
remedial nature of CERCLA impels that it be interpreted liberally
and this claim should therefore not be dismissed over a small pro-
cedural hurdle that would contravene the goals for which CER-
CLA was enacted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court granted Major Electronic Inc.'s motions for
summary judgment. The appropriate standard of review for a
grant of summary judgment is de novo. DeBoer v. Pennington, 206
F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if
the record discloses "that there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to Bearclaw River Keeper, Inc., this Court
must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material
fact and whether the district court correctly applied the substan-
tive law. See Berry v. Valence Tech., Inc., 175 F.3d 699, 703 (9th
Cir. 1999).
ARGUMENT
I. THE PCB-IMPREGNATED SOIL AT MAJOR'S FACILITY
IS A "POINT SOURCE" UNDER 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) AND
MAJOR IS THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF 33 U.S.C. § 1311
FOR THE DISCHARGE OF A POLLUTANT WITHOUT A
PERMIT.
The objective of the CWA is to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."
33 U.S.C § 1251(a). To achieve this goal, CWA § 301 prohibits the
"the discharge of any pollutant by any person" except as author-
ized by specific sections of the Act. § 1311. The pertinent section
here is CWA § 402, the NPDES permit program which makes it
unlawful to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit or
complying with its terms. § 1342; Trs. for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d
549, 553 (9th Cir. 1984). Under § 402, the Administrator of the
EPA, or a state agency acting under an EPA approved permit pro-
gram, issues NPDES permits authorizing effluent discharges in
compliance with conditions stated in the permit. Id. Major Elec-
tronics has a valid EPA issued NPDES permit allowing it to dis-
charge treated effluent from its manufacturing process lines into
the Bearclaw River. R. at 5. However, this permit does not ad-
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dress the discharge of PCBs from the soil beneath the facility to
the Bearclaw River.
When a person is alleged to be in violation of an effluent stan-
dard or limitation, CWA § 505(a)(1) authorizes citizens to bring
suit. § 1365(a)(1). To establish a violation of CWA § 301, a plain-
tiff must show the defendant (1) discharged (2) a pollutant (3) to
navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)
(defining discharge of a pollutant as the "addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source."); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n
v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C.Cir.1982).
Here, the parties stipulate that PCBs are pollutants, the
Bearclaw River is navigable, and that Major Electronics adds
PCBs to the Bearclaw River. R. at 5. Thus, the only issue is
whether the soil is a point source. Major Electronics argues that
since § 301's prohibition against discharge of pollutants applies
only to point sources, they cannot found to be in violation of the
Act since the PCB impregnated soil beneath its facility is not a
point source. However, the soil beneath the facility is a point
source for two primary reasons: (1) the definition of point source is
broadly interpreted and the plain language of the Act expands the
definition of point source beyond pipes and ditches and (2) the soil
is an identifiable point of discharge that can be ascribed to a single
polluter.
A. The definition of "point source" is broadly interpreted
and 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) expands the definition of "point
source" beyond "pipes" and "ditches."
The CWA defines a "point source" as "any discernible, con-
fined, and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated feeding operation, or vessel
or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be dis-
charged." § 1362(14) (emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.2
(EPA regulation defining "point source" in same manner as
§ 1362(14)). United States courts of appeal have widely held that
this definition of a point source is to be broadly interpreted.
Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1009 (11th
Cir. 2004); Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry
Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2002); Concerned Areas
Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farms, 34 F.3d 114, 118 (2d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373
(10th Cir. 1979). The Act does not define "conveyance" but it's
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common definition is "the action of conveying" or "a means of
transport." Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary ( 11th ed.
2003). Further, "convey" means "to bear from one place to an-
other." Id.
In Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co., 870
F.Supp. 983, 988 (E.D. Wash. 1994) the defendant mining com-
pany argued its man-made mining tailing ponds were not point
sources but merely "areas of low topography into which mine tail-
ing from mineral processing activities have been deposited and
through which water may percolate" and that a "point source is
usually a ditch or a pipe." This is similar to Major Electronics ar-
gument that their soil is not a point source since PCBs from its
manufacturing activities have just percolated through the soil
downhill into the River. R. at 4. However, the court in Hecla Min-
ing found the tailing ponds were a point source. 870 F.Supp. at
988. The court reasoned that "it would be irrational to conclude
that the bigger the source of pollution, the less likely it is to be a
'source' under the CWA." Id. Further, "discharges from a pond or
refuse pile can easily be traced to their source. Thus, even though
runoff may be caused by rainfall or snow melt percolating through
a pond or refuse pile, the discharge is from a point source because
the pond or pile acts to collect and channel contaminated water."
Id. The same is true here. The soil has collected PCBs spilled or
leaked during Major's manufacturing activities and is therefore a
point source.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Scrap Metal Processors, 386
F.3d at 1009, held that "piles of debris... collected water, which
then flowed into the stream. [The piles], are therefore, point
sources within the meaning of the CWA." As in Hecla Mining, 870
F.Supp at 988, a point source is something that can "collect" pollu-
tants. The PCBs at Major's facility have built up in the soil to
measurable levels and the soil has thus acted to collect pollutants
which makes it a point source.
The district court below relied on the rationale that soil is not
a man-made conveyance and that being man-made is a distin-
guishing element of a point-source. In addition, 40 C.F.R. § 122.2
defines "discharge of a pollutant" as including "additions of pollu-
tants into waters of the United States from: surface runoff which
is collected or channeled by man. . .." However, the reasoning of
the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co., Inc.,
620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980), is more persuasive. In Abston, a min-
ing company engaged in strip mining placed discarded materials
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in highly erodible piles which were then carried away by rain
water through naturally created ditches. Id. at 43. The court
found that storm water contaminated with sediment and mining
spoil discharged from sediment basins, spoil piles, and through
erosion-created gullies into a nearby stream can be regulated as
point source discharges. Id.
Although it is true that the spoil piles in Abston were man-
made and configured to produce channels down which pollutants
would flow, and that Major Electronics did not construct the soil
beneath its facility or construct a construct a device to channel the
flow of the PCBs into the River, this distinction is insignificant.
The court stated in dicta that "[n]othing in the Act relieves [the
defendant] from liability simply because the operators did not ac-
tually construct these conveyances, so long as they are reasonably
likely to be the means by which pollutants are ultimately depos-
ited into a navigable body of water." Id. at 45. This statement
describes Major Electronics' actions. Although Major did not con-
struct the soil, it is not just the likely means but the actual means
by which pollutants are being deposited into the Bearclaw River.
Whether man-made or not, the soil still collects the PCBs and be-
cause of the downhill gradient from the facility to the river and
rainwater, the PCB impregnated soil moves towards and is depos-
ited in the River.
B. The PCB-impregnated soil beneath Major Electronics
facility is a point source for purposes of proving a
violation § 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) as it is an identifiable
point of discharge that can be ascribed to a single
polluter,
Major Electronics argues that the PCB laden soil is not a
point source which implies it is a "non-point source" of pollution
not regulated under § 301 or § 402 and not defined in the CWA.
The court in United States v. Earth Sciences., Inc., 599 F.2d at
373, stated that Congress has classified non-point source pollution
as runoff caused "primarily by rainfall around activities that em-
ploy or create pollutants" and that such runoff could not be traced
to an identifiable point of discharge. See also Trs. for Alaska, 749
F.2d at 558 (same classification of non-point source pollution).
The court further stated that it "contravenes the intent of [the
CWA] to exempt from regulation any activity that emits pollution
from an identifiable point." Earth Sciences, 599 F.3d at 373. Ex-
amples of non-point sources are "oil and gas runoffs caused by
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rainfall on the highways [which] are virtually impossible to isolate
to one polluter." Id. at 371. The court went on to hold that a re-
serve sump used in mining operations was a point source even
though it was not a "conduit" as mentioned in § 1362(14) but was
a pit or well in which liquids collect. Id. at 374. The court also
pointed out that the "touchstone of the regulatory scheme is that
those needing to use the water for waste distribution must seek
and obtain a permit to discharge that waste, with the quantity
and quality of the discharge regulated. The concept of a point
source was designed to further this scheme by embracing the
broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from
which pollutants might enter the waters of the United States." Id.
at 373.
Similarly here, the soil can more accurately be classified as a
point source rather than a non-point source since the PCBs in the
Bearclaw River can be traced to an "identifiable point of dis-
charge" and it is not impossible to isolate the polluter. As the dis-
trict court below found, it is not disputed that the soil beneath
Major's facility is contaminated with PCBs, R. at 5, and it is thus
identifiable as the source of the PCBs in the Bearclaw River and
contaminating Noblesville's beach. Major Electronics is also the
only source of PCBs in the Noblesville region it is therefore possi-
ble to isolate them as the polluter. Id.
In Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp.
1168, 1173 (D. Mont. 1995), the court held mine pits were discern-
able, confided and discrete conveyances of acid drainage constitut-
ing a point source which required a NPDES permit. The court
cited a statement in an EPA Region VIII letter that "any seeps
coming from identifiable sources of pollution... would need to be
regulated by discharge permits" to support finding the mine pits
were point sources. Id. The soil at Major's facility is a point
source as it is the identifiable source of PCB pollution in the Bear-
claw River. Following Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558, the
court in Beartooth Alliance further explained that "the non-point
source designation is limited to uncollected runoff water which is
difficult to ascribe to a single polluter." Id. There is no such diffi-
culty here. Major admits it is adding PCBs to the Bearclaw River
and it is the only source of PCB contamination in the Noblesville
region, R. at 5; thus, it is easy to ascribe the pollution to a single
polluter and to remove it from a non-point source classification.
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II. THE PCBS ENTERING THE BEARCLAW RIVER
VIOLATE THE STATE OF NEW UNION'S WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS AND ARE THERFORE ACTIONABLE UNDER
THE CWA.
The CWA "provides for two sets of water quality measures."
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992). The first, effluent
limitations, are "promulgated by the EPA and restrict the quanti-
ties, rates, and concentrations of specified substances which are
discharged from point sources." Id.; §§ 1311, 1314. These limits
are technology based standards as they require the use of pollu-
tion control technology. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 822
F.2d 104, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The second, water quality stan-
dards, are "promulgated by the States and establish the desired
condition of the waterway." Id.; § 1313. NPDES permits must in-
clude "technology-based effluent limitations that reflect the pollu-
tion reduction available based on specific equipment or process
changes, without reference to the effect on the receiving water
and, where necessary, more stringent limitations representing the
level of control necessary to ensure that the receiving waters at-
tain and maintain state water quality standards." Natural Res.
Def Council, Inc. v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1400 (4th Cir. 1992);
§§ 1342, 1311(b), 1311(c)).
Water quality standards have three elements: (1) the desig-
nated use or uses of each waterway, (2) criteria expressed in nu-
merical concentration levels or narrative statements, and (3) an
anti-degradation provision. Id.; § 1313(c)(2)(A). New Union has
designated the Noblesville portion of the Bearclaw River as "Class
B" waters suitable for fishing and contact recreation use. R. at 4-
5. New Union set a maximum PCB concentration of X for these
waters. R. at 5. In contrast, Progress has classified its portion as
"Class C" waters suitable for industrial and non-contact recrea-
tional use and does not have a PCB water quality standard. R. at
4.
Major Electronics' discharge of PCBs from its manufacturing
facility violates New Union's PCB water quality standards. This
violation is actionable under the CWA for two reasons: (1) BRK is
authorized to bring suit under § 1365 for violations of water qual-
ity standards and (2) violations of the water quality standards are
themselves a violation of the CWA whether or not the soil is con-
sidered a point source.
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A. Citizens are authorized to bring suit under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 for violations of water quality standards
promulgated under 33 U.S.C. 1313.
Section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 of the CWA authorizes suit for
violations of "an effluent standard or limitation" which includes
"an effluent limitation or other limitation under [§ 301]." Major
Electronics asserts that the Act's citizens suit provision does not
authorize suit here since, according to Major, their facility has no
effluent standard or limitation for PCBs, which means there can
be no violation. However, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Cir-
cuit have emphasized that violations of water quality standards
are enforceable in a citizens suit.
In Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of Portland, 56
F.2d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 1995), the court held that violations of
water quality standards are enforceable in a citizens suit brought
under § 1365. This case is distinguishable from the present case
in that the effluent discharges causing the water quality stan-
dards to be violated were covered by a NPDES permit. Id. at 983.
However, the discharges held to be within the permit did not have
effluent limitations, id. at 985, which makes it similar to Major's
discharge of PCBs which has no PCB discharge limitation. This
case is also distinguishable from the one at bar since in Northwest
Environmental Advocates, the NPDES permit specifically made
violating water quality standards a condition of the permit. Id.
Although Major does have a NPDES permit to discharge waste-
water from its processing lines, the permit does not have a PCB
effluent limitation and it does not cover PCBs discharged from the
soil beneath its facility. R. at 4.
Read more broadly though, the court's reasoning supports al-
lowing suit here. In response to the polluter's argument that
"§ 505 allows citizens to enforce only those water quality stan-
dards that are translated into effluent limitations" the court
stated that "nowhere does Congress evidence an intent to preclude
the enforcement of water quality standards that have not been
translated into effluent discharge limitations." Nw. Envtl. Advo-
cates, 56 F.2d at 986; see also S.Rep. No. 414 (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3671 ("If the wastes discharged by pol-
luters reduce water quality below the standards, action may be
begun against the polluters."). Simply because Major Electronics
is not operating under a PCB effluent limitation does not mean
the enforcement of Progress' water quality standards should be
precluded. See also Wash. Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining
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Co., 870 F.Supp. 983, 968 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (stating the court in
Northwest Environmental Advocates "did not suggest that a per-
mit must be in place before a citizens suit may be brought; rather,
it distinguished between suits to enforce discharge limitations
that would be the subject of a permit and those to enforce general
water quality standards.").
B. Violations of New Union's water quality standards
promulgated under 33 U.S.C. § 1313 are themselves
violations of the CWA.
Major does not deny that New Union's water quality stan-
dards for PCBs are violated after wet weather events or that the
violations are largely, if not entirely, caused by PCBs entering the
River from the soil beneath their facility. R. at 6. But Major does
argue that a violation of New Union's water quality standards is
not an enforceable violation of the Act. Major's analysis rests on
the assertion that to have an enforceable violation, there must be
an addition of pollutants from a point source to a navigable water
without, or in violation of, an NPDES permit under § 301, 33
U.S.C. § 1311. Since, according to Major, the soil is not a point
source, there can be no violation. However, a violation of § 301
can still occur whether or not the soil is characterized as a point
source since violating the water quality standards is itself of viola-
tion of the Act.
Section 1365(a) allows a citizen to commence suit against any
person alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or limita-
tion. "Effluent standard or limitation" is defined as "an unlawful
act under subsection (a) of [§] 1311... [or] an effluent limitation or
other limitation under [§§] 1311 or 1312." § 1365(f). As discussed
above, § 1311 is applicable to point sources. However,
§ 1311(b)(1)(C) lists additional enforceable standards including
state water quality standards: in order to achieve the objectives of
the Act there shall be achieved "any more stringent limitation in-
cluding those necessary to meet water quality standards... or re-
quired to implement any applicable water quality standard
established" under the Act.
The citizens in Oregon Natural Resources Defense Council v.
U.S. Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 1987) used these
statutory provisions to argue they were entitled to sue to enforce
state water quality standards. The court disagreed and held that
"only permit limitations derived from water quality standards, not
the water quality standards themselves, are enforceable by citi-
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zens suits." However the court's rationale relies in part on the
distinction between point and non-point sources: "we do not be-
lieve that the Act allows for the enforcement of state water quality
standards, as affected by nonpoint sources, under the citizen suit
provision." Id. at 849. The present case is distinguishable since,
as argued above, the soil may correctly be classified as a point
source. In addition, the Supreme Court has twice held that viola-
tions of water quality standards are actionable under the CWA.
In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept. of Ecol-
ogy, 511 U.S. 700, 707 (1994), the Court reasoned "[sitates are re-
sponsible for enforcing water quality standards." In addition, the
Court in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101-102 (1992)
stated that "the primary means for enforcing [water quality stan-
dards] is the NDPES" program. Although these cases did not in-
volve citizens suits, the Court's statements are still an
acknowledgement that citizen suits can be used to enforce permit
conditions based on both effluent limitations and state-estab-
lished standards. Although Major is not operating under a permit
with PCB limitations, Major can not avoid liability for violating
water quality standards simply because it is not operating under a
permit.
In Hecla Mining, 870 F.Supp. at 986, the court held that citi-
zen suits can be based on allegations that the polluter is discharg-
ing without a NPDES permit. The mining company argued the
citizens bringing suit had not shown violation of an "effluent limi-
tation" since they challenged the companies failure to get a limita-
tion setting permit in the first place. Id. The court reasoned that
1365(f) defines "effluent limitation" to include "an unlawful act
under subsection (a) of section 1311; 1311(a) in turn makes it un-
lawful to discharge any pollutant except in compliance with the
NPDES permit required in section 1342. Thus, a citizen suit to
enforce an 'effluent limitation' can be based on allegations that the
defendant is discharging without an NPDES permit." Id. at 986.
Similarly here, BRK's suit should be allowed based on the allega-
tion that not only is Major discharging without an NPDES permit,
but those discharges are also causing New Union's water quality
standards to be violated.
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III. BRK MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION IN
NUISANCE AGAINST MAJOR ELECTRONICS UNDER
FEDERAL COMMON LAW.
The district court improperly held that the CWA entirely
preempts the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water
pollution. This error is based on the court's misinterpretation of
the two Supreme Court cases that considered whether the CWA
preempts the federal common law of nuisance in relation to point
sources of water pollution. The district court's broad interpreta-
tion of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois 451 U.S. 304 (1981) and Mid-
dlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ignores the fact that both cases ad-
dress the preemption of the federal common law of nuisance with
respect to point sources, specifically foregoing consideration of
whether a private party may commence an action in nuisance
against a non-point source polluter under the federal common law.
At issue in this case is whether BRK may bring an action in
nuisance under the federal common law against Major Electron-
ics. The CWA does not explicitly preempt the federal common law
and no court has ever held that the Act implicitly preempts the
federal common law of nuisance with respect to non-point sources.
Because the federal common law has never been explicitly or im-
plicitly preempted, an injured party may maintain an action nui-
sance under the federal common law against an injury-causing
non-point source polluter.
A. A finding that the soil beneath the Major Electronic facility
does not constitute a point source under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14) places the facility outside the regulatory
scope of the CWA.
The regulatory scheme established by the CWA turns upon
the distinction between point sources and non-point sources. The
CWA "establish[ed] an all-encompassing program of water pollu-
tion regulation" through which "[every] point source discharge is
prohibited unless covered by a permit, which directly subjects the
discharger to the administrative apparatus established by Con-
gress. .. ." Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 318. All sources falling outside
or specifically excluded from the "point source" definition are con-
sidered non-point sources for the purposes of the Act. Although
not explicitly defined in the Act itself, it is generally accepted that
non-point source pollution is "nothing more [than] a [water] pollu-
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tion problem not involving a discharge from a point source." Gor-
such, 693 F.2d at 166, n. 28. Therefore, if this Court determines
that the soil beneath the Major Electronic facility does not consti-
tute a point source, it must find that it is a non-point source of
pollution.
Characterizing the Major Electronic facility as a non-point
source of pollution has far-reaching implications for the CWA's
role in regulating the ongoing PCB contamination of the Bearclaw
River. Because they fall outside the NPDES permitting program
established by the CWA, the EPA lacks the authority to regulate
effluents discharged from non-point sources. Defenders of Wildlife
v. EPA, 415 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, al-
though the Act requires states to designate water quality stan-
dards and to identify those waterways that do not meet these
standards, "nothing in the CWA demands that a state adopt a reg-
ulatory scheme for non-point sources." Id. (quoting Am. Wild-
lands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1194 (10th Cir. 2001)). A ruling
by this Court that the soil beneath the Major Electronics facility
does not constitute a point source precludes regulation of this
source of contamination through the CWA's permitting scheme
and eliminates the ability of a private party to bring an enforce-
ment action under the Act's citizen suit provision. Thus, an in-
jured party's only possible recourse for an injury caused by a non-
point source polluter lies in the common law.
B. The holding of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois preempts
the federal common law of nuisance in relation to point
sources only, leaving the cause of action available for
parties injured by non-point source polluters.
Despite the district court's representations to the contrary,
the Supreme Court in Milwaukee did not hold that the CWA com-
pletely preempted the federal common law of nuisance. Instead,
the Court narrowly limited its reading of the CWA to preempt the
federal common law of nuisance with respect to point sources only.
At issue in Milwaukee was whether parties could use federal com-
mon law to impose more strict effluent limitations on point source
polluters than those required in their NPDES permit. 451 U.S. at
305. The Court determined that "[federal] courts lack authority to
impose more stringent effluent limitations under federal common
law than those imposed by the agency charged by Congress with
administering" the comprehensive regulatory scheme created by
the CWA. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 320. This decision was based on
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the fact that "the problem of effluent limitations has been thor-
oughly addressed through the administrative scheme established
by Congress." Id. The Court was concerned that applying federal
common law of nuisance to sources covered by a NPDES permit
could supplant or render ineffective the CWA's comprehensive reg-
ulatory scheme. Id. at 317.
The Supreme Court did not consider the preemptive effect of
the Act on the federal common law of nuisance in regards to non-
point sources of water pollution because these sources fall outside
of the regulatory scheme established by Congress. The district
court's interpretation of the Milwaukee decision is overbroad and
ignores the rationale behind the Supreme Court's narrow holding.
Because no comprehensive permitting program exists for non-
point sources and Congress has chosen not to provide for their reg-
ulation under the Act, this Court need not be concerned with ren-
dering ineffective any provision of the CWA. Therefore, the only
permissible reading of the Milwaukee decision requires this Court
recognize the continued availability of an action in nuisance
against non-point source polluters under the federal common law.
C. The Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association merely
reaffirmed the City of Milwaukee v. Illinois decision
that the federal common law of nuisance is
preempted in relation to point sources, leaving the cause of
action available for parties injured by non-point source
polluters.
The district court also misinterpreted Sea Clammers, 453
U.S. 1, a Supreme Court case decided the same year as Milwau-
kee, 451 U.S. 304. The district court erred by holding the Sea
Clammers decision completely preempted the federal common law
of nuisance in the water pollution context. The issue before the
Court in Sea Clammers was whether all federal common-law nui-
sance actions concerning ocean pollution were pre-empted by the
regulatory scheme established in the CWA and the Marine Protec-
tion, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA). 453 U.S. at 11.
Focusing narrowly on the issues before it, the Court held that "the
federal common law of nuisance has been fully pre-empted in the
area of ocean pollution." Id. Similar to its rationale in Milwaukee,
the Court's decision was based on the comprehensive nature of the
regulatory scheme established by the CWA.
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Because the Court only considered ocean pollution, it deter-
mined "it need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages
by a private party." Id. at n.17. The circumstances of this case
present a compelling reason for this Court to hold that the federal
common law of nuisance can be the basis of a suit by a private
party because without the availability of the federal common law
a private party would be left without a remedy under federal law
for an injury inflicted by a non-point source polluter. Therefore,
this Court should reject the district court's broad reading of Mil-
waukee and Sea Clammers and hold that the federal common law
of nuisance is not preempted by the CWA in relation to non-point
sources of water pollution.
IV. BRK MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION IN
NUISANCE AGAINST MAJOR ELECTRONICS UNDER
NEW UNION COMMON LAW.
The district court improperly held that BRK may not main-
tain an action in nuisance against Major Electronics under New
Union common law. This erroneous decision was based on the
Court's misinterpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in In-
ternational Paper, 479 U.S. 481, where it again considered the
preemptive scope of the CWA. In International Paper, the Court
specifically considered whether the CWA preempts Vermont com-
mon law to the extent that such law may impose civil liability on a
New York point-source. The Court held that Vermont common
law was preempted and could not form the basis of a suit against
an out-of-state point source. However, the Court did not consider
whether one state's common law could be used to impose liability
on an out-of-state non-point source polluter. This Court must con-
sider whether or not BRK may use New Union's common law of
nuisance to impose liability on Major Electronics, a corporation
whose facility is located upstream in the State of Progress and is
responsible for the PCB contamination of the Bearclaw River. Be-
cause the district court misread International Paper to apply to all
sources of water pollution and the CWA does not preempt or con-
flict with New Union common law in relation to non-point sources,
its granting of summary judgment to Major Electronics must be
reversed.
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A. The district court erred in holding that the Court in
International Paper did not distinuish between the
CWA's preemptive effect on point source versus non-
point source pollution.
The district court erred by distinguishing between the CWA's
preemptive effect on point source versus non-point source pollu-
tion. In International Paper, the Supreme Court clearly held "that
when a court considers a state-law claim concerning interstate
water pollution that is subject to the CWA, the court must apply
the law of the State in which the point source is located." 479 U.S.
at 487. Here, there is not a point source of water pollution. In-
stead, the soil beneath the Major Electronics facility is a non-point
source of pollution and thus falls outside the narrowly limited
scope of the Court's holding.
Furthermore, the Court in International Paper went to great
lengths to describe the comprehensive nature of the scheme under
which point sources are regulated. This scheme was the key fac-
tor in the Court's determination that a state court must apply the
law of the State in which the point source is located. The Court
recognized that "if affected States were allowed to impose sepa-
rate discharge standards on a single point source, the inevitable
result would be a serious interference with the achievement" of
the purposes of the CWA. International Paper, 479 U.S. at 493.
The Court was concerned that subjecting permit holding discharg-
ers to common-law suits could render the permitting scheme of
the Act meaningless. Id. at 497. This concern has no application
in the context of non-point sources because they fall outside the
regulatory scope of the Act. Therefore, the district court erred in
holding that International Paper did not distinguish between
point sources and non-point sources. Accordingly, BRK may use
New Union's common law of nuisance to impose liability on Major
Electronics.
B. The CWA does not preempt the operation of New
Union's common law of nuisance as it applies to a non-
point source of water pollution ori inating in the State
of Progress.
It is universally accepted that the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates state laws that "interfere with, or
are contrary to," federal law. Hillsborough County v. Automated
Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (quoting Gibbons v.
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Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824)). The Court in International Paper
recognized three ways that state law can be preempted by a fed-
eral statute. 479 U.S. at 491. Adopting the analytical framework
of the International Paper decision, this Court must hold that the
CWA does not preclude the common law of one state being used to
impose liability on an out-of-state non-point source polluter. Ac-
cordingly, this Court should rule in BRK's favor and allow it to
commence an action in nuisance against Major Electronics under
New Union's common law.
i. The CWA does not explicitly preempt the operation of
New Union's common law of nuisance as it applies to a
non-point source of water pollution originating in the
State of Progress.
Under the Supremacy Clause, a federal statute may explicitly
provide for the preemption of state law so long as Congress acted
within constitutional limits. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713. Al-
though Congress acted constitutionally under its commerce power
in adopting the CWA, it did not expressly preempt state law.
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1329
(6th Cir. 1974); U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Therefore, any pre-
emption of state law under the Act occurs impliedly or to the ex-
tent that the state law is in conflict with the CWA.
ii. The CWA does not impliedly preempt the operation of
New Union's common law of nuisance as it applies to a
non-point source of water pollution originating in the
State of Progress.
In the absence of a provision explicitly providing for preemp-
tion, such preemption may be inferred when "the scheme of fed-
eral regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable
the inference that Congress "left no room" for supplementary state
regulation." Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713 (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Considering whether
there was 'room' for supplementary state regulation, the Court in
International Paper concluded "if affected States were allowed to
impose separate discharge standards on a single point source, the
inevitable result would be a serous interference with the achieve-
ment of the "full purposes and objectives of Congress." 479 U.S.
494. The primary objective of the Act is to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters through the application of a comprehensive regulatory
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scheme to point sources of pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1251, 1342. Be-
cause no such scheme exists for non-point sources, there is ample
'room' for state regulation. To allow BRK to use New Union's com-
mon law of nuisance to impose liability on Major Electronics
would not interfere with the NPDES program and would actually
help achieve the goal of reducing water pollution. Therefore, the
Act does not impliedly preempt the operation of New Union's com-
mon law of nuisance as it applies to a non-point source of water
pollution originating in the State of Progress.
iii. New Union's common law of nuisance as applied to a
State of Progress non-point source polluter does not
conflict with the CWA.
Even where Congress has not completely displaced state reg-
ulation in a specific area, state law may be preempted to the ex-
tent that it conflicts with federal law. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at
713. Such a conflict will be found when state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress," Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941)). When considering whether the application of Ver-
mont law to a New York point source conflicted with the objectives
of the CWA, the Court in International Paper held that a state law
is "pre-empted if it interferes with the methods by which the fed-
eral statute was designed to reach [its] goal." 479 U.S. 494. It
also recognized that applying the one state's common law to an
out-of-state point source polluter would "circumvent the NPDES
permit system" and impose common law liabilities "even though
the source had complete with its state and federal permit obliga-
tions." Id. at 494-95. Applying New Union law to Major Electron-
ics is a dramatically different situation than that considered in
International Paper because it is not subject to the NPDES per-
mitting system. Because non-point sources fall outside this per-
mitting system and have no federal or state effluent limitations to
meet, there is no conflict between New Union common law and the
methods by which the CWA was designed to reduce water pollu-
tion. Accordingly, this Court must hold that the district court
erred in holding of International Paper preempts the application
of New Union's common law of nuisance to a non-point source lo-
cated in the neighboring State of Progress.
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V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE
"SPECIAL INJURY" RULE TO BAR BRK'S PUBLIC
NUISANCE CLAIM
Public nuisance is defined as "an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public." Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 821B (2005). Historically, there are three elements to a
successful public nuisance claim brought by a private party: (1)
The existence of a public nuisance, (2) the Defendant must have
created, contributed to or maintained the nuisance, and (3) the
public nuisance must have caused the private party to suffer a
"special injury". It is this last element that is unjustifiably
preventing BRK from their day in court. The rationale for the
"special injury" requirement no longer justifies its use when pri-
vate parties seek an injunction, and should not be utilized here.
However, if this court applies the "special injury" requirement,
BRK can show that they have suffered an injury "different in
kind" and their claim for public nuisance should be heard on the
merits.
A. The "Special Injury" requirement should not be used to
bar a hearing on the merits of the public nuisance claim
"[It] is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have van-
ished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imita-
tion of the past."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev.
457, 469 (1897).
The "special injury" rule is an anachronism that should no
longer be blindly followed. It has its roots in a 16th century En-
glish case. The dissent in that case noted that a private party
should be able to bring a public nuisance claim if he "had a greater
hurt or inconvenience that any other man had." Louise A. Halper,
Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aft. L. Rev. 89, 99
(1998) (quoting Sowthall v. Dagger, Y.B. 27 Hen. Fo. 27, pl. 10).
This dissent has become the "special injury" requirement that has
survived to this day. However, the concerns that necessitated the
"special injury" rule at the time are no longer applicable and
therefore the rule should be eliminated.
[Vol. 23574
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss2/8
BEST BRIEF OVERALL
The "special injury" rule is generally given a "tri-partite" ra-
tionale. It will prevent multiplicity of similar actions, prevent triv-
ial suits and "prevent interference with the discretion of public
authorities." William H. Rodgers, Environmental Law: Air and
Water, §2.2, pg. 36 (1986). These reasons are of little concern in
the modern legal system and especially so in regards to parties
seeking injunctions. If a private plaintiff succeeds in enjoining the
nuisance, there is no need for other parties to bring suit. If the
private plaintiff is not successful then res judicata principles will
prevent similar suits from being brought. As to trivial lawsuits,
modern courts have established methods to extinguish those lack-
ing merit early in the process such as summary judgment and mo-
tions to dismiss. The last justification is that these suits would
interfere with the sovereign public's role. This may have been true
at the time the rule was created as nuisances were the King's re-
sponsibilities. Times have clearly changed. Modern courts have
acknowledged the concept of the "private attorney general", e.g.,
Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 P.2d 803 (Wash. 1984), and citizen
suits have been enacted into many of the environmental statutes. 2
The ALI recognized that the special "injury rule" no longer
serves a purpose in the public nuisance context when parties seek
injunctions.
In order to maintain a proceeding to enjoin or abate a public
nuisance, one must: (a) have the right to recover damages, as
indicated in Subsection (1) (special injury) .... (c) have standing
to sue as a representative of the general public, as a citizen in a
citizen's action or as a member of a class in a class action.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C (2005)
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has taken up this progressive
rule and abandoned the "special injury" requirement and replaced
it with an "injury in fact" test. Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d
1130, 1134 (Haw. 1982). To take account for some of the concerns
that underlie the "special injury" requirement, the plaintiff must
also demonstrate "that the concerns of a multiplicity of suits are
satisfied by any means." Id. Expanding the ability of Plaintiffs to
satisfy standing requirements in public nuisance cases, as Hawaii
has done, would be in line with other areas of the law. The Su-
preme Court has broadened standing to challenge agency deci-
2. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); Solid Waste Disposal, 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(2005)
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sions. In addressing injury in fact requirements the Court said,
"the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the
many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of
legal protection through the judicial process." United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 686 (1973). They have also allowed standing to those who are
claiming aesthetic injury. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972).
This court should change as modern times dictate and not
prevent meritorious claims from being heard if the justifications
for barring them have long since vanished.
B. If the court insists on using the "special injury"
requirement, BRK has suffered an injury "different in
kind,"
The traditional "special injury" rule requires that plaintiffs
must show that their injury is "different in kind" and not just "dif-
ferent in degree" from that suffered by the general public. See,
Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1211 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying
California law); Frey v. EPA, 270 F.3d 1129, 1137 (7th Cir. 2001)
(applying Indiana law). BRK can show that the pollution has
caused their members, an injury which is in fact different in kind.
The pollution has affected the "livelihood" and it has caused physi-
cal harm to members of BRK different in kind from other citizens
of New Union.
i. BRK has suffered harm of livelihood which is a "special
injury" recognized by courts
Courts have consistently held that a public nuisance that
harms ones livelihood is an injury "different in kind" and meets
the "special injury" test. "[I]n substantially all of those cases in
which commercial fisherman using public waters have sought
damages for the pollution or other tortuous invasion of those wa-
ters, they have been permitted to recover." Burgess v. MIV
Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973). Harm of livelihood
to farmers has also been recognized as a "special injury." In re
Starlink, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
The plaintiffs are not involved in commercial activity but the
effect on the citizens of Noblesville is similar because they rely on
fishing for their livelihood, which is defined as "support or subsis-
tence". Merriam-Webster Dictionary (11th ed., 2005). Noblesville
is the poorest city in New Union and the average citizen is just
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above the poverty line. To supplement their meager incomes, the
residents must fish in order to feed themselves and their families.
To say that fishermen who rely for their income on fishing are
specially injured while those who fish to eat because their income
is insufficient, are not, would elevate form over substance. In ei-
ther situation, the pollution is limiting their ability to "support".
In this instance, the fish merely act as a proxy for income and
should be treated similarly.
Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.
1997), would appear to foreclose such a claim of special injury but
can be readily distinguished. The plaintiffs, natives of Alaska,
brought a claim for public nuisance resulting from the Exxon
Valdez oil spill. They had already recovered economic damages for
loss of fish harvest and were seeking additional recovery because
their "way of life" had been damaged. This is in stark contrast to
what BRK claims. Noblesville residents were fishing because they
needed the fish to live. The Alaskan citizens were making a loss of
culture argument. BRK argues that they have suffered, in es-
sence, an economic loss caused by the pollution.
This economic loss is not suffered by others in the general
public. Other members of the state are able to buy enough food
that has not been poisoned with PCB's and are thus not affected in
the same way.
ii. The physical harm caused by consumption of poisonous
fish is per se "different in kind"
"Injuries to a person's health are by their nature "special and
peculiar" and cannot properly be said to be common or public."
Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1233 (D. Mass.
1986); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C, comment d
(2005). The fish in Bearclaw River have been found to contain
levels of PCB's that exceed safe levels established by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) and The New Union Department of
Environmental Conservation (NUDEC) has stated that swimming
in the Bearclaw River may expose users to unsafe levels of PCB's.
The average resident of Noblesville consumes twelve pounds of
fish every year. As mentioned above, the residents are forced to
eat fish from the River due to the poor state of the economy in the
city. In addition, if they want to swim, they must do so in the
River because there is no public pool. The PCB laden fish and
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chemical makeup of the River itself are thus physically harming
the residents of Noblesville3 .
The injury to those who must eat the fish and swim in the
River is not as extensive or obvious as that alleged by plaintiffs in
Anderson because the physical harm has not manifested yet. How-
ever, other areas of law are expanding the reach of "injury" in re-
gards to exposure to toxic pollutants and future injuries. The
Supreme Court granted standing to an environmental group due
to the future damage caused by proximity to nuclear power plants
emissions.
[T]he emission of non-natural radiation into appellees' environ-
ment would also seem a direct and present injury, given our
generalized concern about exposure to radiation and the appre-
hension flowing from the uncertainty about the health and ge-
netic consequences of even small emissions like those
concededly emitted by nuclear power plants.
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
74 (1978)
It is important that BRK does not seek damages. It is unclear
exactly how much any individual will be affected by the PCB's in
Bearcreek. In that case, a court might understandably choose not
to find an injury, because it is uncertain what the exact level of
injury is. However, since only an injunction is sought, there
should be a more liberal interpretation of injury. There will be
some adverse effects from repeated exposure to these PCB's, with
an injunction these effects will hopefully be minimized. The physi-
cal injury that is being suffered, and will be manifested, by those
that are forced to use the polluted river is not imposed on others
who can swim in pools and can afford to eat non-contaminated
fish.
3. The International Agency for Research on Cancer and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency classify PCBs as a probable human carcinogen. The National Toxicol-
ogy Program has concluded that PCBs are reasonably likely to cause cancer in
humans. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has determined
that PCBs are a potential occupational carcinogen. Studies of PCBs in humans have
found increased rates of melanomas, liver cancer, gall bladder cancer, biliary tract
cancer, gastrointestinal tract cancer, and brain cancer, and may be linked to breast
cancer. www.clearwater.org/news/pcbhealth.html
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VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BRK'S CLAIM BASED ON
INCONSISTENCY WITH THE NCP.
CERCLA is an environmental statute enacted to effectuate
two goals: "(1) the cleanup of toxic waste sites and (2) the compen-
sation of those who have attended to the remediation of environ-
mental hazards." Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v.
Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2001).
Private, innocent parties can recover costs they spent to attend to
hazards from responsible parties who are liable for "any other nec-
essary costs of response... consistent with the national contin-
gency plan" or "NCP" under §107 of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B). BRK seeks to recover, consistent with §107, the
costs they incurred in placing warning signs on the fences sur-
rounding the public beach in Noblesville.
The district court erred in granting Appellee summary judg-
ment on this claim. Summary judgment is permissible when a
party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of
its claim. The court below, in error, included consistency with the
NCP as an essential element. The consistency requirement should
instead be examined after liability has been determined. A parties
failure to be consistent with the NCP may lead to a reduction in
the recoverable amount, but should not bar a claim completely. To
prevent a claim for recovery when a party is otherwise liable
would subvert the goals of CERCLA.
A. Consistency with the NCP is not an element of a claim
under §107 and therefore summary judgment cannot be
granted on this basis
Summary judgment is proper when a party is able to show
that "there is no genuine issue as to any fact." Fed R. Civ. Pro
56(c). The defendant may argue that the plaintiff "has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case with
respect to which the plaintiff has the burden of proof." Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The district court
granted summary judgment on the basis that BRK's claim was
inconsistent with the NCP. However, consistency with the NCP is
not an essential element of the claim and therefore is an inappro-
priate basis to grant summary judgment.
The circuits are split on what is required to make out a prima
facie case under §107 of CERCLA. All agree that there are at least
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four elements to a prima facie case of liability: "(1) the Defendant
must fall within one of four categories of responsible parties, (2)
the site is a "facility" defined by CERCLA, (3) there is a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance at the facility, and (4)
the plaintiff has incurred response costs in connection with the
release or threatened release." Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton
Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321, 325 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Uni-
royal Chem. Co. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 1998);
Vill. of Milford v. K-H Holding Corp., 390 F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 2004).
However, several circuits have included a fifth element; consis-
tency with the NCP. Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc., v. City of N.
Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002); Young v. United
States, 394 F.3d 858, 862 (10th Cir. 2005). This fifth element was
the basis of the district court's summary judgment order.
The proper interpretation is the one taken by the Seventh
Circuit in Kerr-McGee. This interpretation does not do away with
the consistency requirement. Instead, it shifts it to the damages
stage. This is consistent with the purpose of CERCLA ("a remedial
statute which should be construed liberally to effectuate its goals."
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d
Cir. 1992)). The statute was enacted "to promote safe and speedy
cleanups of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the parties
responsible for contamination finance the cleanups." James R.
Deason, Clear as Mud: The Function of the National Contingency
Plan Consistency requirement in a CERCLA Private Cost-Recovery
Action, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 555, 588-89 (1994) (citing CERCLA legisla-
tive history). Requiring private groups to survive a number of pro-
cedural hurdles merely to get to liability would contravene this
purpose. Parties may be less willing to voluntary undertake
cleanup if the slightest misstep on their part will prevent them
from recovering costs that benefit the general public. Even if inno-
cent parties do continue to voluntarily cleanup, the second pur-
pose will not have been fulfilled. The burden of financing the
cleanup will have not have fallen on the responsible parties.
Postponing consistency issues to the damage stage where
they might possible be limited due to inconsistency with the NCP
would further the goals of CERCLA while minimizing judicial
costs. Courts would be able to determine immediately whether
there was a responsible party at all. If not, then the case will be
quickly dismissed. If there is a responsible party under §107, then
the court can bog down in the consistency issue. This is in line
with the purpose of the NCP consistency requirement which was
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"imposed not to determine whose actions necessitated the need for
a cleanup, but to ensure that the cleanup was adequate and cost-
effective." Deason, supra, at 584 (explaining Amoco Oil Co. v. Bor-
den, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989)).
B. Even if consistency with the NCP is an element of the
prima facie case, there are circumstances when summary
judgment is not proper
The 10th Circuit is one of the courts that have held consis-
tency with the NCP is a prima facie element of a §107 CERCLA
claim. County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th
Cir. 1991). However, the court noted "there are some circum-
stances in which a CERCLA plaintiff may be entitled to a declara-
tion of the defendant's liability even though the plaintiff has not
yet. established that all of the claimed response costs were in-
curred consistent with the NCP." Id. One of those circumstances is
when "the factual record does not permit a determination of con-
sistency with the NCP" when the motion for summary judgment
was filed. Id.
The limited record available in this case is a prime example of
when the court should defer their determination of consistency of
the NCP to trial. BRK is able to make a showing of the four ele-
ments required under the Seventh Circuit test. The only issue
that could bar BRK is consistency with the NCP. The record shows
that BRK has spent money to erect signs warning Noblesville re-
sidents of the dangers of using Bearclaw River. This alone is po-
tentially enough to satisfy the NCP requirements. It would be
unjust to dismiss the claim over this small issue that is not even
required in some Circuits. The factual record will have the oppor-
tunity to be fleshed out if the claim is allowed to be heard on its
merits. As noted above, the remedial nature of the statute should
cause this court to interpret broadly to achieve the purposes of the
statute.
Summary judgment is a judicial tool whose "fundamental pol-
icy... is to cut off baseless suits, thereby conserving judicial re-
sources and protecting defendants from harassment in courts."
Bruce D. Wickersham, Circumstantial Evidence and CERCLA
Generator Liability: Are Courts Making Summary Judgment Eas-
ier for PRPs?, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. Rev. 121, 130 (1995). This is
clearly not a baseless suit. BRK is able to satisfy all of the ele-
ments required by some circuits and there is only one element in
dispute according to others. The defendant is already in court on
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several other issues, so this would not be a waste of judicial re-
sources to expand the record as to resolve a contentious issue. Fi-
nally, BRK's suit is not intended to harass Major. BRK merely
seeks to recover costs they expended to protect citizens from
harmful pollutants that resulted from activities in which Major
engaged.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, BRK respectfully request that this
Court reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment.
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